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time. In pursuing both objectives, we will use the 
canonical issue of the relation between organisation 
and environment as a guiding principle. By showing 
how this issue has been variously addressed by 
different scholars, we will show not only how the 
contributions can be brought together into an 
articulated unified perspective, but also how the 
divergence of views can be used as a step towards a 
new conception of the environment and the way in 
which MASs relate to it. This will pave the way for a 
set of implications regarding the conditions under 
which MASs will behave passively, re-actively, or 
proactively, and the type of cognitive processes on 
which each of these forms of behaviour rests.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as 
follows. The next section will introduce our model of 
MAS. In section 3, the model will be discussed by 
looking for common threads among organisational 
theories. The discussion will focus on the determinants 
of sociality (section 3.1), and on the main mechanisms 
through which sociality changes over time (section 
3.2). Section 4 summarises our major findings and 
provides indications for future research. It is perhaps in 
setting the future research agenda that the main 
contribution of this paper lies. As it stands, the paper 
represents a manifesto for the future landscape of MAS 
research. Only time will tell whether this vision 
becomes a reality. 
 
2. A Model of MAS 
 
Science is primarily aimed at finding order in the 
complexity of nature. To do so, it must partition the 
object of analysis into various discrete segments, 
explain their interdependencies, and establish 
boundaries. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, noting this, drew 
its logical conclusion [45]. He observed that, if science 
is primarily concerned with problems of organisation, 
then the most general science of all is expected to be a 
science of organisation itself. This is the core idea that 
underpins what is known as "general system theory" [5, 
21]. This theory has inspired our work in two main 
ways. First, building on the attempts that have been 
variously made by scholars to develop and apply the 
systems view to the behavioural and social sciences 
[21, 23], we will use the open-system perspective for 
representing and reasoning about MASs. Second, 
drawing on recent advances in the cybernetics of social 
systems, we will conduct our analysis by endorsing the 
point of view of the MAS, here modelled as a cognitive 
entity that, through feedback and morphogenetic 
mechanisms, is capable not only of performing 
maintenance and adaptive behaviour, but also of 
autonomously re-organising and re-producing its own 
structure from within [31].  
Figure 1 illustrates our model of MAS, its 
structure and the dynamic interplay of its main 
components. In this section, we give a brief overview 
of the model and its articulation, whereas a critical 
discussion will be carried out in the following section. 
Against the theoretical background outlined above, the 
model is premised on the following definition of MAS: 
Definition 1. A MAS is a social and cognitive entity, 
with a relatively identifiable boundary, that functions 
on a relatively continuous basis through the 
coordination of loosely interdependent, cognitive and 
autonomous agents. 
 
Instead of discussing the above definition by looking at 
each of its components in the order they appear, we 
will follow an alternative strategy. We will reconstruct 
the genesis of the definition by adhering to the path 
through which a MAS comes into existence, shapes its 
structure, engages in cognitive or behavioural activities, 
and produces outcomes. The remainder of this section 
will therefore be articulated as follows. First, the 
determinants of sociality will be introduced (section 
2.1); the individual agent will then be modelled 
(section 2.2); the other two main components of the 
system’s structure will then be outlined, namely the 
contextual factors (section 2.3) and the organisational 
variables (section 2.4); the concept of agenthood will 
then be extended from the individual to the collective 
level (section 2.5); finally, the outcomes of the 
system’s processes, and their effects, will be examined 
(section 2.6). 
 
2.1 Determinants 
 
The model rests on two assumptions. First, the MAS is 
seen as located in an environment from which it may be 
constrained and upon which it may impact
1 [52]. 
Second, the generation and functioning of the MAS is 
modelled as motivated by a dependence network, 
namely a set of social dependence relations that hold 
among agents [17, 49]. Environment and dependence 
network are inherently intertwined with each other for 
the following reasons. First, changes in the 
environment (e.g. availability of resources) bring about 
changes in the ways the agents depend on one another. 
Second, the dependence network impacts back onto the 
environment by affecting the ways in which agents are 
clustered and organised, which in turn affects the 
productivity of the resources used and the ways in 
which these are allocated between the agents. Again, 
this impacts on the ways in which agents depend on 
one another, and so on ad infinitum.  
Environment and dependence network influence 
the generation and functioning of the MAS by affecting 
its structure and, via this, its processes. The structure of 
a MAS refers to the enduring pattern of systematic 
relationships among the components of the system. The 
system's processes refer to the dynamic integration of 
the structural components into a consistent set of 
cognitive and behavioural joint activities. At the heart 
of the complex mechanisms that relate the system's 
structure to its processes lies our conception of socio-
cognitive agenthood which, in turn, builds on the role 
                                                           
1 As explained in section 3.2, the strength of the dependence between 
MAS and environment may have differing degrees, from the case in 
which the MAS is deterministically "selected" by its environment, 
through to the case in which the environment is relatively impotent in 
its effect on the MAS. In particular, the latter case will give us the 
opportunity to discuss and re-assess the very notion of environment 
(see section 3.2.2.3).  3
that cognition plays both at the individual and the joint 
level.  
 
2.2 The Individual Agent 
 
Agenthood is seen as existing at two interrelated levels: 
the individual and the collective one. At each level, 
agenthood is expressed in terms of cognition and 
behaviour. Let us start our analysis with the individual 
level. The first component of the centre box in Figure 1 
shows the set of individual agents who are the members 
of the MAS and, therefore, represent its basic structural 
components. Here, the individual agent is regarded as 
an autonomous, socio-cognitive entity capable of 
individual social behaviour [47]. First, being 
autonomous means being able to operate independently 
[52]. Second, for an agent to be termed cognitive it 
must be endowed with mental attitudes representing the 
world and motivating action [36, 39, 41, 52]. Further, 
for a cognitive agent to be deemed socio-cognitive it 
must not only have an intentional stance towards the 
environment, but also represent other agents as 
cognitive agents similarly endowed with mental 
attitudes for representational and motivational purposes 
[14]. These properties of individual agenthood can be 
conceptualised and operationalised by modelling the 
agent as having a cognitive structure and being capable 
of performing cognitive processes. According to 
mainstream cognitive science, a cognitive structure is a 
set comprising basic mental attitudes, cognitive 
principles for modifying these attitudes, operators for 
adding mental attitudes, the cognitive frame, the 
language, control procedures, social interaction 
propensities, and principles and mechanisms for 
generating inter-agent social behaviour [6]. A key role 
within the agent’s cognitive structure is played by the 
mental state. This is a set of the basic mental attitudes, 
including beliefs, goals, intentions, preferences, etc. 
[11, 41]. Building on its cognitive structure, the agent 
can engage in a variety of cognitive processes, such as  
conceptualisation, sense-making, categorisation, 
theoretical and practical reasoning, and so forth [2]. 
These processes are primarily intended to process, 
modify or discard the agent’s mental attitudes and/or 
other components of its cognitive structure, or even 
generate new ones. In this respect, cognitive structure 
and cognitive processes are related to each other, in that 
the former provides the cognitive components for 
undertaking the latter, while the latter affect the former 
by modifying these components or adding new ones.  
Besides being endowed with a cognitive 
structure and capabilities of undertaking cognitive 
processes, the agent is also modelled as being capable 
of  individual social behaviour aimed at producing 
effects on other agents. Specifically, an agent's 
behaviour is social when it is regulated by the agent's 
cognitive structure, and is oriented towards another 
agent who, in turn, is regarded as a cognitive agent 
whose behaviour is regulated by a cognitive structure 
and a set of cognitive processes [47]. According to this 
conception, the agent's individual social behaviour rests 
on its cognitive structure, in that it is controlled by the 
principles of social behaviour which, in turn, are 
affected by the agent's mental attitudes [6]. Therefore, 
individual social behaviour is indirectly influenced by 
the agent’s cognitive processes because these impact 
upon the mental attitudes and principles that ultimately 
trigger and control behaviour. Finally, individual social 
behaviour impacts back upon the agent's cognitive 
structure, and via this, on its cognitive processes. In 
fact, by interacting with others, the agent acquires new 
information, fulfils its goals, modifies its preferences, 
etc., and this, in turn, will provide new inputs for the 
agent's cognitive processes (see also section 2.5).  
 
2.3 Contextual Factors  
  
Both the agent's cognition and social behaviour are 
constrained by and impact upon two interrelated super-
individual components of the system's structure: a set 
of contextual factors and the organisational variables 
(shown in the middle of the centre box of Figure 1). 
The former include five main subsets of situational 
factors. First, the techniques (i.e., the equipment and 
processes required to transform inputs into outputs) and 
technologies (i.e., the set of codified knowledge 
concerning the techniques adopted) that are used to 
undertake social activity or simply to manage the social 
interactions within the system [43]. Second, the 
institutional variables, namely, the high-level functions 
pursued by the MAS within a higher-level system (e.g. 
the economy as a whole), the ways in which the 
outcomes of its activities are allocated among its 
members, and the nature of its social externalities (e.g. 
opportunities for value creation) [38]. Third, the social 
profile of the system, namely, the nature of the social 
relations among its members (i.e., their content, 
finalities, complexity, intensity, specificity, strength, 
frequency, formalisation and degree of trust, reciprocity 
and clarity of expectations), the number and types of 
sub-groups, the set of roles and their relations, the 
nature and articulation of the communication processes, 
the social influence patterns that the agents use to 
govern their interdependencies and make decisions, and 
the ways in which conflict between agents and/or sub-
groups is managed [12, 19]. Fourth, the structural 
properties of the inter-agent social network, namely its 
dimension, connectivity, degree centrality, betweenness 
centrality, structural equivalence, clustering, and the 
number and forms of cliques [28, 46]. Finally, the set 
of physical objects and resources that are used within 
the system.  
All the above contextual factors need to be 
consistent with one another, in that, each of them is 
constrained by and constrains all the others. Also, they 
need to be consistent with the set of the agents who are 
the members of the system. For example, the 
technology used, by affecting the way in which 
activities are carried out, is related to what physical 
resources are used and how they are logistically 
organised, which in turn may affect the number and 
identity of the agents that are members of the system 
(as they control these resources), which affects what 
social relations and subgroups are formed in the  4
system, which determines the structural properties of 
the social network representing the links between each 
agent, which in turn can impact on how effectively and 
efficiently the system can undertake its institutional 
functions, and whether or not social externalities are 
generated in pursuing social activity, which impacts 
back onto the choice of the appropriate technologies 
and techniques, and so on ad infinitum. Finally, this 
causal chain can be re-formulated in the opposite 
direction; it may also start from the set of the agents or 
any other contextual factor, and it may relate all its 
elements in any other different order. 
 
2.4 Organisational Variables 
 
Organisational variables refer to the ways in which 
social activity (if any) is divided into distinct tasks and 
then coordination is achieved among these tasks within 
the system. As it turns out, organisational variables can 
be analysed into two fundamental components: the 
organisational structure and the organisational 
mechanisms. Even though there is by no means 
complete agreement as to what makes up the term 
"organisational structure", almost all definitions seem 
to convey the idea that this notion refers to the 
"division of labour" into a relatively stable pattern of 
tasks that are allocated among the members of a system 
in order to carry out a joint activity [33]. The 
organisational mechanisms, on the other hand, refer to 
the ways in which distinct tasks, once distributed 
among the members of the system, can be coordinated 
to accomplish social activity [20]. Examples of these 
mechanisms are: procedures for controlling and 
evaluating behaviour and results; standardised 
procedures for collaborative decisions; organisational 
power; remuneration and the reward system. Whenever 
any form of social activity is to be carried out, these 
organisational mechanisms lie at the root of the 
equilibrium and stability of the system. In fact, they 
allow, together with other integrative mechanisms 
within the set of social contextual factors (e.g. 
communication, social influence), first the components 
of the organisational structure to combine with one 
another, second the organisational structure as a whole 
to dynamically integrate with all the other structural 
components of the system. Conversely, when no social 
activity is performed, equilibrium is brought about only 
by using social integrative mechanisms.  
 
2.5 Joint Cognition and Behaviour 
 
Organisational and social mechanisms can be seen as 
the key elements for understanding the path leading 
from the individual level of agenthood to the collective 
one. As with the individual agent, we have two 
fundamental components of the collective level of 
agenthood: joint cognition and joint behaviour. Again, 
cognition can be analysed into its static and dynamic 
components. On the one hand, the mental states of the 
members of the system combine in such a way that a 
joint mental state will ensue [52]. This includes 
varying joint doxastic, motivational and deontic mental 
attitudes, such as mutual beliefs, joint intentions, joint 
commitments [36]. On the other hand, joint cognitive 
processes rest on and transcend the complex interplay 
between the agents’ individual cognitive processes. 
Similarly, joint behavioural processes build on and 
transcend the agents' individual social behaviours. 
Against this background, two fundamental questions 
regarding the internal structure and functioning of 
collective agenthood are: (i) to what extent does the 
joint mental state relate to the set of joint processes, 
and how can the former regulate the evolution of the 
latter? (ii) are the cognitive and behavioural joint 
processes related to each other, and if so, what are the 
mechanisms that govern this relation? 
Answering these questions leads us to elucidate 
the core principles that underpin our conception of 
socio-cognitive agenthood. In turn, these principles 
strictly build on and can be explained in terms on the 
key functions played by the individual agents' 
cognition and behaviour. As to the first question, we 
note that joint mental state and joint processes as a 
whole co-evolve, in that changes in one of them impact 
upon the other in a two-way direction, through the 
mediation of the individual’s cognition and behaviour. 
In order to gain an insight into this co-evolution, it is, 
therefore, necessary to understand the mediating role 
played by the individual’s cognition and behaviour.  
First, joint processes find their cognitive roots 
in the system's joint mental state, in a causal chain 
involving the agents' cognitive structures, cognitive 
processes, and individual social behaviours [36]. As to 
the joint cognitive processes, they are rooted in the 
joint mental state through the impact that this has on 
the individual agents' mental states, and these on the 
agents' cognitive processes. For example, it is a mutual 
belief, as well as various other forms of shared 
information, that leads the agents to undertake 
individual cognitive processes of reasoning that, 
ultimately, combine into joint cognitive processes of 
sense-making or knowledge creation. Likewise, joint 
behavioural processes build on the system's joint 
mental state through the impact that this has on the 
agents' mental states and cognitive processes and these, 
in turn, on the agent's individual social behaviour. For 
example, it is a joint commitment to achieving some 
state of affairs that gets the agents' mental states to 
trigger and control the performance of the cognitive 
processes of practical reasoning concerning how to 
attain that state. In turn, the outcome of these processes 
will provide the agents with the necessary cognitive 
ingredients for undertaking individual social 
behaviours that, ultimately, will combine into a joint 
behavioural process of negotiation aimed at reaching 
an agreement among the agents about how to attain 
that state.  
Second, joint processes feedback into the 
system's joint mental state by affecting the individual 
agents’ cognitive structures. In fact, joint processes 
produce results that directly affect the agents' cognitive 
structures. As the individual agent engages in joint 
processes, it may acquire new beliefs, fulfil its goals 
and intentions, or modify some of them. Experiential  5
wisdom accumulates as a result of positive and 
negative reinforcement of prior mental attitudes [6]. 
Mental attitudes that have led to what are encoded as 
positive outcomes are reinforced, while those that have 
led to negative outcomes are modified or discharged 
[40]. Finally, as a result of their impact upon the 
agents' mental states, joint processes affect the system's 
joint mental state as this is cognitively grounded on the 
individual agents’ mental attitudes. For example, 
failure to successfully undertake negotiation may lead 
the agents (or some of them) to generate the belief that 
no agreement can reasonably be made. In this case, the 
agents will exit negotiation and the joint commitment 
they maintained with one another will be dropped.  
In the light of the above observations, 
answering the second question - whether and how 
cognitive and behavioural processes are related to each 
other - is reasonably straightforward. As with the 
individual level, these processes are related also at the 
collective level. However, as opposed to the individual 
level, joint cognitive processes are not directly linked 
to joint behavioural processes, but they co-evolve 
through the mediation of the individual's cognition and 
behaviour. Thus, changes in either cognitive or 
behavioural joint processes need to impact on 
individual agents' cognition and behaviour before they 
can affect each other and show a consistent path of co-
evolution. For example, should a joint commitment to 
achieving some state via some joint action be formed 
as a result of a joint cognitive process, this will affect 
the agents' cognitive structures to the extent that a new 
joint commitment needs to be consistently integrated 
within the agents' mental states. In turn, the joint 
commitment, via affecting the agents' mental states, 
will generate and control the performance of individual 
social behaviours that, ultimately, will converge into 
joint behaviour. Again, co-evolution between joint 
cognitive and behavioural processes rests on the 
impact that the outcome of joint behaviour has on the 
agents' cognitive structures and on the links that these 
have with individual cognitive processes and, 
therefore, with the system's joint cognitive ones. 
As it stands, our model conveys a conception of 
joint cognition and behaviour that, even though 
sympathetic with the idea of allowing some forms of 
higher-order behaviour and group mind-like constructs 
to play a role in sociality, nevertheless is not consistent 
with an anthropomorphic image of the MAS. In fact, 
the theoretical position we endorsed suggests a notion 
of MAS in which forms of joint cognition and 
behaviour are always seen as rooted in the individual 
agents, namely in their cognitive structures, and their 
capacity of undertaking cognitive and behavioural 
processes.  
 
2.6 Outcomes 
 
Before we conclude this section, we need to briefly 
examine the role of the outcomes and their effects on 
the system's structure and functioning. We mentioned 
above that the outcomes may directly impact on the 
agents' cognitive structures. For example, should the 
system generate new knowledge, this will affect the 
agents' cognitive structures and modify their set of 
information and beliefs. In turn, new configurations 
and instantiations of the agents' cognitive structures 
will impact upon the structure of the dependence 
network (as changes in beliefs, goals, preferences etc. 
drive changes in "who depends on whom"). Finally, 
different ways in which the agents depend on one 
another will ultimately correspond to different ways in 
which the system is internally structured and behaves. 
At an extreme, should the agents fulfil the goals on 
which their dependence network was grounded, they 
will exit the system as no further joint activity would 
be required with respect to these goals. Furthermore, 
the outcomes may impact on both the contextual 
factors and the organisational variables. For example, 
the system’s activity can bring about a refinement of 
the techniques adopted, or it can impact on the type 
and quantity of resources used. Finally, besides 
impacting directly on the system, the outcomes may 
impact onto the environment and, via this, on the 
system. For example, changes in what resources are 
available, how scarce they are, how they are allocated 
among the agents, affect the ways in which different 
agents depend on one another, and therefore, whether 
or not a new MAS should be created and with what 
structure, or an existing one should be differently 
structured or even abandoned, should it be no longer 
consistent with the environment and the dependence 
network.  
 
3. Organisation Theories and MASs 
 
With this section, we begin a critical discussion of the 
model introduced above. In doing so, we will attempt 
firstly to look for common threads within 
organisational research and thought, secondly to show 
how an integrated organisational perspective can be 
used as the background for our model, and can help 
describe and reason about a wide range of forms for 
organising sociality. In accordance with the internal 
articulation of the model, we start our discussion with 
the factors that can be thought of as the determinants of 
sociality (section 3.1). Section 3.2 will be devoted to a 
critical evaluation of the environment-MAS 
relationship. The discussion will shed light on the 
complexity of this relation, and the ambiguous role 
played by the environment in its link with the MAS. It 
will be shown that MASs can be seen as the product of 
sociality-variation mechanisms reflecting either: (i) the 
environment's attempts to deterministically "select" the 
fittest forms of sociality; or (ii) the MASs' attempts to 
adapt their structure and behaviour to the environment; 
or (iii) the MASs' attempts to pro-actively shape their 
structure and behaviour by removing any 
environmental constraint.  
 
3.1 The Antecedents of Sociality 
 
As shown in Figure 1, what may determine whether or 
not a MAS is established, how it is structured, and 
ultimately how it evolves over time is the complex  6
interplay between the environment and the network of 
dependencies among agents. The relevance of these 
factors, and particularly how they relate to each other, 
will be the subject of the following sections. 
 
3.1.1 Environment 
 
"Just take the universe, subtract from it the subset that 
represents the organisation, and the remainder is the 
environment" (see [33], p. 195). We agree with the 
author of this definition when he adds that, 
unfortunately, it really isn't that simple. In fact, the 
issue of defining the environment is a delicate matter 
that has not only theoretical but also practical 
implications concerning the governance of pluralistic 
systems in the real world. First, the notion of 
environment becomes relevant as long as it is defined 
with respect to some object. Thus, before a MAS has 
come into existence, there is no environment as such. 
Instead, what we can identify is a set of causal factors 
that can be thought of as the determinants of the 
generation of a new MAS. Second, given an existing 
MAS, the problem of defining the environment 
becomes that of identifying the system's boundaries. 
Furthermore, building on our definition of MAS as a 
cognitive entity and the related assumption to conduct 
our analysis by endorsing the MAS's internal 
perspective (see section 2), boundaries are what the 
system considers as such. This raises two related 
questions. Firstly, how can we, as external observers, 
identify the factors, if any, that can be regarded as 
outside the boundaries of a MAS? Secondly, what are 
the mechanisms, if any, that enable these factors to 
impact on the MAS?  
In order to answer the first question, we will 
endorse a conception of environment that is 
comprehensive and articulate enough to account for 
not only already existing MASs, but also for new ones 
that have not yet been established. 
 
Definition 2. Before a MAS comes into existence, 
environment is the set of resources and phenomena 
that can determine whether or not the system is 
generated and what its structure and functioning will 
be. After a MAS has been generated, environment is 
the set of resources and phenomena that the system, as 
a cognitive entity, believes are outside its boundaries, 
and can affect its structure and functioning
2.  
 
In the above definition, environmental resources may 
be either agents, physical objects, cognitive properties 
(e.g. abilities, know-how), techniques, technologies, 
norms, rules, and institutional values [38], while 
environmental phenomena may be simple events or 
actions performed by agents or MASs. The problem 
here is to understand under what circumstances these 
factors and phenomena can be thought of as external to 
                                                           
2 Note that the definition is consistent with the fact that the MAS may 
ignore some of the resources and phenomena that can affect and 
constrain its structure and functioning. However, since the MAS does 
not take them into account, these factors are not part of the system's 
environment and, as such, do not represent a potential target at which 
the system's strategies, policies, activities, etc. may be addressed. 
a MAS, thus representing its own environment. 
However, as might be expected, if we are to endorse 
the system's viewpoint to define its boundaries, we 
eventually fall into a vicious circle: as the decision 
does not rest on us, as observers, everything can be 
outside and inside the system. Unless we are the agents 
of the system
3, there is no way out of this dilemma, 
and every attempt to identify what resource is outside 
the system is bound to fail. One way to circumvent this 
difficulty, however, is to give up any attempt to define 
what an environment is by identifying the specific 
resources and phenomena that do not pertain to a 
system, and instead try to identify the key properties of 
these resources, whatever they are, that can affect the 
nature of the system and how it behaves. To this end, 
building on Dess and Beard's work [15], we suggest 
three environmental dimensions: capacity, complexity 
and volatility. First, the capacity of the environment 
refers to the degree of availability of resources, and the 
degree of heterogeneity and/or substitution between 
them. Second, complexity refers to the degree of 
concentration among resources, namely how they are 
allocated among agents and who has control over what 
resource. Finally, the volatility dimension reflects the 
degree of instability of the environment, namely how 
predictable events and actions are over time. Now, 
having defined the properties of the environment, we 
turn to the second question above and try to understand 
how these properties can affect a MAS.  
 
3.1.2 Dependence Network 
 
A fundamental key for understanding how the 
environment can impact on MASs is to consider how 
the environment affects the ways in which agents 
depend on one another. However, before we do this 
(see section 3.1.3), we need to shed some light on the 
concept of dependence. As one of the major 
determinants of social behaviour, social dependence 
has long been studied by a variety of disciplines, 
ranging from sociology [4], organisation science [18, 
43], to distributed artificial intelligence [17, 49]. In 
compliance with our objective to offer a synthetic 
organisational perspective on MASs, social dependence 
will be here explored building on the major 
contributions that have been given by the leading 
scholars in organisational research and thought in the 
last few decades.  
Emerson’s studies on dependence provided the 
spark for the subsequent development of the concept 
and its incorporation into organisation theory [18]. His 
general point was that there are different degrees of 
social dependence. In fact, an agent can be seen as 
dependent on another (i) in proportion to the former's 
need for resources or actions which the latter can 
provide and (ii) in inverse proportion to the availability 
of other resources or the abilities of other agents to 
provide the same resources and actions. In terms of a 
                                                           
3 Also in this case, however, defining the environment is not 
straightforward, as most of the time the agent's and the system's 
viewpoints do not overlap. In fact, the perspective of the system 
builds on and transcends the perspective of the constituent agents.   7
comprehensive theory of organisations, it is 
straightforward to note how this perspective is relevant 
for understanding the conditions under which 
organisations are created, grow, establish relations with 
other agents or organisations, and sometimes fail. In 
fact, by focusing on the possibilities of differing 
degrees of dependence, Emerson’s research led other 
scholars to explore how and to what extent social 
dependence can be effectively managed, and therefore 
avoided or sought. Along these lines, Blau generalised 
Emerson’s ideas by analysing the conditions under 
which agents will be able to maintain their 
independence in a situation of potential dependence, 
and the conditions that agents must meet to ensure the 
dependence of autonomy-seeking agents [4].  
The potential of Emerson's studies for the 
development of a comprehensive theory of 
organisations has been emphasised by Thompson, who 
argued that the relations among the agents within an 
organisation can be represented in terms of their 
interdependencies [43]. Building on this, he sought to 
create a classification scheme that was general enough 
to deal with the range of interdependencies found in 
complex organizations. His intuition was that each type 
of interdependency (namely, sequential, pooled, and 
reciprocal) demands a certain type of coordination that 
will facilitate organisational effectiveness yet minimise 
costs. Drawing on Thompson's intuition, Williamson 
showed how a theory of the organisational boundaries 
could be developed by linking the effectiveness of 
various intra- and inter-organisational relations to a 
taxonomy of interdependencies among agents and 
economic transactions, under the constraint of the 
minimisation of coordination costs [50]. Even though 
Williamson's contribution is primarily restricted to the 
economic organisation and the economic transaction of 
goods and services occurring within and between 
economic organisations, it can nonetheless offer 
invaluable insights for a theory of MASs that is 
concerned not only with the economic organisation, but 
also with other types of pluralistic social systems in 
which relations and transactions between agents do not 
necessarily involve economic exchange.  
Against this background, it is interesting to 
understand how the path that led from social 
dependence to the ontology of the organisation could 
be further extended so as to derive, from a dependence-
based theory of organisations, a more general 
dependence-based theory of MASs. In this respect, 
there are three fundamental problems that need to be 
addressed. Firstly, as noted above, because MASs do 
not only refer to economic organisations, the notion of 
dependence needs to be built on a notion of exchange 
between agents that does not only account for the 
economic transaction of goods and services, but also 
for the exchange of information, the emotional 
exchange (e.g. friendship), and the normative exchange 
(e.g. exchange of influence, power, norms) [34]. 
Secondly, the notion of social dependence needs to 
become comprehensive enough so that two or more 
agents may happen to be dependent on one another 
even when no exchange at all (either economic or 
social) occurs between them. A key to this refinement 
is Thompson's notion of pooled interdependencies [43], 
where two or more units contribute separately to a 
larger unit. In this case, to assume that a MAS is 
composed of interdependent agents is not necessarily to 
say that each agent is involved in some form of 
exchange with each other agent in any direct way. Yet, 
the agents are interdependent in the sense that unless 
each acts adequately, the total MAS is jeopardised. 
Furthermore, by rendering a discrete contribution to the 
whole, not only can failure of any agent threaten the 
whole and thus the other agents, but also each agent 
can be seen as supported by the whole. Thirdly, we 
need to introduce a further notion of social dependence 
so that two (or more) agents may happen to be 
dependent on one another even when between them 
there are no pooled interdependencies and when no 
exchange, in any of its forms (i.e. economic, 
informative, emotional, normative) takes place. This 
happens when the agents are dependent on one another 
through the mediation of a third agent. In this respect, 
we suggest the distinction between symbiotic 
dependencies, where exchange occurs directly between 
the parties involved, and competitive dependencies, 
where two or more agents depend on the 
resources/abilities of a third party. Competitive 
dependencies cannot be equated with pooled 
interdependencies because the former, as opposed to 
the latter, do not imply a collaborative effort of the 
dependent agents toward the achievement of a common 
goal. Nor do they involve any form of direct exchange 
between the parties, as the dependent agents are 
interested simply in the effects that each other’s 
behaviour has on the third party. Therefore, 
understanding the importance of competitive 
dependencies is a fundamental key to widening the set 
of pluralistic systems to be conceptualised against a 
common theoretical background. For example, 
competitive dependence is the essence of those 
mechanisms of organising and governing large 
numbers of loosely interdependent agents, usually 
grouped under the common banner of "market". In fact, 
the firms who refer to the same client are competitively 
dependent on one another, in the sense that each 
depends on the resource that the client controls and is 
able to offer, and the actions it can perform. 
 
3.1.3 Environmental Impact on Social Dependence 
 
Having discussed the notion of social dependence, as a 
fundamental intermediating link between environment 
and MAS, we now need to show how the three 
environmental properties introduced above can affect 
the set of social dependencies among agents. In the 
following section, we will explore how dependence, 
affected by the environment, may impact on the 
structure of MASs. The first environmental property 
we mentioned is capacity. The capacity of the 
environment affects the nature and form of social 
dependencies in the sense that it determines whether 
the agents can use their own resources to pursue their 
goals, or need to lean on others'. Abundant capacity,  8
for example, and resources extensively available for a 
variety of purposes, widen the agents' abilities to act in 
isolation and lower their incentive to organise 
pluralistic forms of social activity. Conversely, scarcity 
of resources imposes constraints on the performance of 
solipsistic activities, and tensions on the functioning of 
existing MASs
4. In the same line of argument, but with 
more emphasis on the distributional dimension, 
complexity affects dependence, in that it refers to who 
controls what, thus determining potential social 
relations among agents. Simple environments, 
characterised by resources available to everybody, 
enhance the agents' possibilities to effectively act in 
isolation, whereas highly complex environments, 
where resources are dispersed among the agents, 
restrict these possibilities, and constrain the structure 
and functioning of existing MASs. Finally, the degree 
of environmental instability affects social dependence 
by impacting on the accuracy of the information that 
the agents maintain about the environment. When there 
is a high degree of unpredictable change, the 
environment is highly volatile and dynamic, and the 
information about it highly uncertain. This makes it 
difficult for the agents to accurately predict the 
outcomes of various decision alternatives, and acting 
in isolation becomes a less attractive way of achieving 
expected results than alternative forms of joint activity 
that conversely may help create "negotiated" and more 
stable environments [50]. Furthermore, highly volatile 
environments impose tensions on already existing 
MASs, by making it more difficult to assess and 
predict the efficiency of their structure and the 
effectiveness of their behaviour. At the other extreme, 
when the environment is stable, acting in isolation 
becomes more effective and attractive, and social 
activity in existing MASs becomes easier to be 
efficiently and effectively carried out.  
Before we leave the topic, it is interesting to 
note that the dimension of volatility has long been 
studied in the organisational literature, particularly in 
the form of task uncertainty [27, 43]. Whereas 
mainstream decision theory defines uncertain those 
situations in which one is unable to assign a probability 
to an event, organisational research has given a more 
articulate conceptualisation. In the first place, the 
longer the interval of time between the performance of 
a task and the generation of its outcomes, the more 
uncertain the task. In the second place, task uncertainty 
is related to the agents' cognition. In this respect, the 
more unstructured, uncodified, inaccurate are the 
information and know-how of the agent(s) who is to 
perform a task, the more uncertain is that task. As it 
turns out, this notion of task uncertainty emphasises 
the agents' abilities to perform effective actions by 
focusing on the impact that the environment has on 
their know-how, and is therefore consistent with our 
notion of volatility that refers to the impact of the 
environment on the accuracy of the agents' information 
                                                           
4 However, it could be argued that a certain amount of scarcity of 
resources is necessary in order for a MAS to have the incentive to 
behave efficiently and to stimulate innovation [26]. 
concerning "what is the case" and "how to get things 
done".  
 
3.2 The Environment-MAS Relation: Sociality-
Variation Mechanisms  
 
The issue of the environment-MAS relation, in its 
simplest form, can be presented as the role of the 
environment  versus the role of the MAS. It is 
analogous to nature-nurture debate over formative 
influences on the development of humans. The more 
sociologically interesting topic is to determine under 
what conditions each is most influential, and what 
questions and explanations are made salient by a study 
of complex forms of sociality. Every MAS depends on 
its environment to some degree. However, we cannot 
ignore that some are much more dependent than others 
are. One way to understand the key issues involved 
here is to consider two ideal paradigmatic models of 
variation in sociality: an environmental selection 
model and a rational selection model. The former 
places heavy reliance on environmental forces and 
their tendencies to select the fittest forms of sociality, 
whereas the latter emphasises the active role of agents 
and MASs in creating and shaping sociality. By 
presenting the underlying assumptions and 
characteristics of each mechanism, we will take some 
steps towards a new integrated perspective. Bypassing 
the problem of unambiguously defining a "unique" 
form of sociality that comes into existence and changes 
over time in a unique specified manner, we will 
propose a new conception of MASs, here regarded as 
pluralistic systems that, with respect to their 
environment, can be either passive, reactive or pro-
active, depending on what environmental conditions 
they need to face and how prepared they are to face 
them. 
 
3.2.1 Environmental Selection: The Case of 
Emergence  
 
On theoretical grounds, to say that MASs are selected 
by the environment means rejecting the teleological 
implications inherent in theories of societal or 
organisational development based on the role of 
individuals, and model the source of variation in 
sociality in terms of any variation-generating 
mechanism that is built more on unplanned than 
planned change
5. In this respect, a great deal of 
variation is introduced into a MAS through error or 
random variation, rather than through the rational 
planning and the choice of alternatives pursued by the 
system and its members. The reasons why a MAS is 
generated or an existing MAS is structured and 
behaves in a particular way may be only dimly 
understood by the members, even though they will 
probably attribute the outcomes of the system's 
                                                           
5 As explained in Note 2, the MAS may ignore some of the factors 
that can constrain its structure and behaviour. Therefore, also (some 
of) these factors can activate natural selection mechanisms that can 
lead the MAS towards unplanned results. In this section, however, we 
focus our attention on the selection pursued by those factors that are 
part of the system's environment (see Definition 2).  9
activities to their own efforts at rational selection. 
When the individual agents are relatively powerless to 
affect the process of generating and structuring 
sociality, what we need to do in order to understand the 
sources of variation in sociality is to shift the burden of 
choice from the individuals' cognition to the working 
of an impersonal "invisible hand". This invisible hand 
is the driving force behind the emergence of new 
MASs or new structures and forms of behaviour of 
existing MASs [1, 16, 22, 38, 49]. 
The idea of a MAS as an emergent system that 
is "decided" by the environment without the mediation 
of the agents' cognition has a two-fold implication. 
Firstly, a set of agents may happen to become 
members of a new MAS without having decided to do 
so. Secondly, an existing MAS may happen to have a 
structure and to perform behaviours that cannot be 
totally explained in terms of its own and its members’ 
decisions. In Figure 1, the process of environmental 
selection has been represented in two related ways. 
Firstly, through the relation between the dependence 
network and the MAS. In fact, one of the main reasons 
that may explain the emergence of MASs is that the 
agents may not be aware of (some of) their 
(inter)dependencies. However, being dependent on 
some other agents may lead them, in trying to pursue 
their goals, to naturally behave in such a way that new 
forms of sociality are brought about without being a 
priori represented in their mental states, and the 
structure of existing forms of organising sociality may 
change without being the result of rational decisions. 
Secondly, on a more general level, environmental 
selection can directly affect the MAS, bypassing the 
intermediation of the dependence networks. For 
example, in some cases the environment may be so 
volatile that any attempt by the agents to predict its 
future configurations will inevitably fail and so will 
their attempts to manage the environment and change 
the system's structure by using tactics and strategies. 
Or furthermore, the structural conditions of a MAS 
may be so persistent and inertial, that any decision to 
change them will inevitably have effects procrastinated 
in time, and therefore different from what was initially 
expected.  
Within the organisational literature, the late 
Seventies have seen the growth and development of 
what certainly stands as the major landmark 
contribution favouring this extreme environmental-
imperative position. This contribution - which has been 
labelled the natural selection or population ecology 
(PE) view [1, 22] - argues that the environment selects 
certain types of organisations to survive and others to 
perish, on the basis of the fit between their structure 
and environment. Drawing on biology's survival-of-
the-fittest doctrine, the PE view claims that 
organisations that survive have resources and structural 
dimensions that the casualties do not. Along these 
lines, shifting the perspective from what had long been 
the focus in economic and organisational research, it 
has been argued that it is not the organisation, but the 
environment, that optimises [22].  
As it stands, in its emphasis on the active role of 
the environment and the limited degree of freedom of 
the organisation, this position provides contributions as 
to how to theorise about MASs that need to cope with 
complex, constantly changing, and uncertain 
environments. In fact, some of the conditions that, 
according to the PO view, would favour the activation 
of mechanisms of natural selection, seem to be 
particularly suited to describe the challenges that some 
of today's MASs need to deal with. These conditions 
are: the high volatility of the environment and the 
related complexity and uncertainty of the information 
about it; the dimension of conflicting interests and 
objectives of the agents involved in most social 
systems, which makes these systems appear like forms 
of integration of the many rather than holistic super-
individual entities, and makes any attempt to internally 
re-organise their structure rather costly and 
inconvenient; the costs of innovation; the 
specialisation of techniques and technologies and the 
related problem of high costs of information and 
barriers to entry in most markets; and, finally, the 
problems of the irrationality of the macro-behaviour of 
multiple interconnected units, which is particularly true 
in today's internet-based global communities where a 
behaviour that is effective when undertaken by a single 
agent may not turn out to be so when simultaneously 
undertaken by many related agents.  
Even though shifting the focus from the MAS 
to its environment emphasises the challenges the latter 
imposes onto the former in terms of inescapable 
constraints, nonetheless the PE view is limited by the 
fact that it obscures the MAS's power and ability to 
partially control the environment in which it acts. This 
is a major limitation because some of today's MASs 
still maintain control over their environment, and can 
insulate themselves against failure. Along these lines, 
it can be argued that a comprehensive model of MASs 
needs to be broad enough to account for a variety of 
forms of organising sociality, ranging from MASs with 
no control over their internal configuration and 
deterministically constrained by their environment, 
through to those that can balance the challenges of the 
environment with their own abilities to decide how to 
be structured and behave, and finally MASs that have 
complete control over their own decisions and 
behaviour, and can even remove any environmental 
constraint. In order to account for all these types of 
MASs, we need to integrate the environmental 
selection mechanism with new mechanisms of 
generation of sociality, focused on the MAS's 
possibilities to rationally select its own structure and 
behaviour. This will be the topic of the next section. 
 
3.2.2 Rational Selection 
 
Rational selection places reliance on the role of the 
agents' and the MAS's cognition in managing the 
challenges posed by the environment. Given the set of 
environmental constraints, two or more agents may 
decide whether or not they should join and establish a 
MAS. Similarly, an existing MAS, through its  10
members, can decide how to configure its structure and 
how to behave, given a set of environmental 
constraints. In both cases, the environment impacts on 
sociality to the extent that it is cognitively represented 
in the agents' cognitive structures, and via these, in the 
system's joint mental state. As shown in Figure 1, 
rational selection is represented in two related ways. 
Firstly, through the role of the dependence network. In 
fact, "who depends on whom" may ultimately 
determine whether or not two or more agents, aware of 
their dependencies, decide to establish a new MAS. 
Secondly, through the impact that the outcomes of the 
system's processes have on the components of its 
structure. The system may decide how to be structured, 
and its decisions and behaviours may lead to outcomes 
that affect not only the agents, but also the contextual 
factors and the organisational variables. Besides, by 
impacting on the agents, the system's outcomes affect 
their dependencies, and again via these, the system's 
future configurations. 
Rational selection is built on two fundamental 
processes [24]. The first is rational planning, by which 
expectations about future consequences are used to 
choose among current alternatives (section 3.2.2.1). 
The second process is learning from experience 
(section 3.2.2.2). Through learning, feedback from 
previous experience is used to choose among present 
alternatives. Both processes are based on the 
assumption that the environment can be (partially) 
controlled, in the sense that it provides a set of 
constraints to which a MAS can adapt its own structure 
and behaviour. However, besides these processes, there 
is another one that, while building on both of them, 
rejects and goes beyond the assumption of a partially 
controllable environment. This process is rational 
proactiveness (section 3.2.2.3). Either through rational 
calculation or through learning by trial and error, not 
only can adaptation to environmental constraints be 
ensured, but also these constraints can be changed and 
removed. All of these three processes will now be dealt 
with in turn. 
 
3.2.2.1 Rational Planning 
 
Rational planning represents a variation-generation 
mechanism that, building on the individuals' cognitive 
structures and abilities, is used to explain change in 
sociality resulting from rational calculation. It 
inherently rests on a form of cognition that is regarded 
as a forward-looking form of intelligence premised on 
an agent's beliefs about the link between the choice of 
actions and the subsequent impact of those actions on 
the environment. Typically, agents and MASs can 
resort to rational planning when: (i) the environment is 
stable enough to provide a schedule of responses to 
alternative actions on the part of the agents and the 
MAS; (ii) the agents (and the MASs) are aware of their 
own goals, intentions and preferences, and these 
influence their behaviour; and (iii) the mechanisms 
through which the agents' cognition and behaviour are 
transformed into the MAS's cognitive and behavioural 
processes are known. Under these assumptions, agents 
and MASs have a degree of freedom from 
environmental forces, and changes can be brought 
about in sociality either by the agents' decisions as to 
whether and how to generate a new MAS or by MASs' 
decisions about the effectiveness and efficiency of 
their structures.  
The claim that the system's effectiveness and 
efficiency are function of the combination between its 
structure and environment can be regarded as the main 
tenet of what is known as the Structural Contingency 
(SC) theory of organisations [27]. During the 
Seventies, this was the theory that represented the 
dominant paradigm within organisational research. 
Because all organisations are dependent, in some 
degree, on their environment, they need to meet the 
environmental pressures by appropriate structures [20, 
27, 43]. Many of the propositions of the SC theory 
directly draw on March and Simon's cognitive theory 
of organisations as systems for processing information 
[29]. Two main concepts are borrowed from the 
cognitive approach: differentiation of an objective into 
distinct sub-objectives, and integration among sub-
objectives. Differentiation and integration are then 
used to help generate indications as to how to build 
organisational structures with differing degrees of 
flexibility, or capacity of adaptation, or even capacity 
to process information and solve problems.  
Even though the emphasis has been primarily 
on the organisation of economic activity, there are 
many ways in which these indications can be used to 
enhance MAS theory and practice. Firstly, drawing on 
the SC claim that there are no universal principles of 
management, it can be similarly argued that there is no 
best way to manage or organise a MAS. What structure 
it should have depends upon the circumstances and the 
environment. In this view, MAS management practice 
is entirely situational. Secondly, since MAS 
management is situational, it needs to sharpen its 
diagnostic skills, so it will know the right thing to do at 
the right time. In this respect, the contingency 
approach can supply the management of MASs with 
diagnostic concepts, tools, methods and techniques that 
are helpful in analysing and solving situational 
problems. Finally, since there is no value imperative 
on MAS management other than to diagnose situations 
correctly, all managerial tasks need to be integrated in 
order for the MAS to react with rational expediency. 
Again, the contingency models are useful in this 
respect as they can be used for a variety of purposes, 
ranging from strategy formulation, to organisational 
design and redesign, information decision systems, 
influence systems and leadership.  
Despite its central role in reaffirming the 
necessity for researchers and practitioners to dwell 
upon the practical, day-to-day, situational puzzle-
solving tasks, the SC theory has been heavily criticised 
for its paucity of content. Many modern organisation 
theories arose precisely as a response to that approach, 
all advocating the possibility of different ways in 
which the adaptation of the organisation to its 
environment may occur. Among these theories, in this 
section we will review some that are built on the  11
rational planning mechanism; others, centred around 
the concept of adaptive learning, will be dealt with in 
next section. 
The main line of argument along which some 
scholars in organisation theory have criticised the SC 
approach is the following: The adaptation of the 
organisation to its environment cannot be represented 
by a nomological law that, to each environmental 
configuration, assigns only one type of efficient 
organisational structure. The reason for this is three-
fold.  
First, there is more than one strategy through 
which the organisation can act, either in stable or more 
uncertain environments, and each strategy has its own 
structural implications. As Child pointed out, the 
organisational design cannot be seen as the product 
only of technical demands presented by environment, 
technology and size [9]. He argued that these variables 
provide constraints to the set of feasible organisational 
solutions, but within this set the choice of a particular 
solution depends on the strategic decision-making 
carried out by the actors involved in the organisation. 
Second, the "one-best-way-of-organising" prescription 
for each type of environment is not entirely justifiable 
in environments with abundant capacity of resources. 
In fact, in these situations, either a strictly efficient 
structure or a structure characterised by "organisational 
slack"
6 can be equally adopted, where the latter, even 
though not justifiable in terms of efficiency criteria, 
can nonetheless be explained in terms of higher 
degrees of freedom and power of (some of) the 
constituent members [13]. Third, the response to an 
increase in environmental uncertainty cannot be only 
the adoption of a more flexible organisational 
structure, as the SC approach seems to suggest, 
internally more differentiated and based on integrative 
mechanisms that rely on mutual adjustments among 
differentiated units [27, 43]. Rather, besides the 
generation of slack resources that may help adaptation 
when external pressures become higher and more 
variable, the organisation may change its boundaries. 
This is the main line of argument that has been used by 
two research programmes. On the one hand, the 
Markets & Hierarchies (MH) programme, building on 
the key behavioural assumptions of actors' bounded 
rationality and opportunism, shifted the emphasis from 
the organisational unit to the transaction between units, 
and addressed the organisational design problem as a 
transaction cost issue [50, 51]. Against this 
background, the crucial argument was that unrealised 
efficiency opportunities always offer an incentive to 
redefine the boundaries among organisations and/or 
among internal organisational units until the 
transaction costs are minimised. On the other hand, the 
possibility to modify organisational boundaries has 
been emphasised by the Resource Dependence (RD) 
research programme [37]. This programme rests on the 
assumption that the problem of adapting the 
organisational structure to the environment cannot be 
                                                           
6 This is the "disparity between the resources available to the 
organisation and the payments required to maintain the coalition" 
([13] p. 42). 
explained only in terms of the organisation's need to 
cope with the environmental uncertainty. Rather, many 
of the attempts that organisations make to ensure their 
future survival and growth are primarily related to the 
problem of managing their dependencies on resources 
that are controlled by other actors/organisations within 
the environment. In this perspective, avoiding or 
weakening resource dependence and/or generating or 
increasing others' dependence are the driving force 
behind a number of boundary-spanning strategies, 
ranging from those impacting on intra-organisational 
variation (e.g. diversification; horizontal and vertical 
integration), to those relying upon inter-organisational 
variation (e.g. joint ventures; interlocking directorates). 
Finally, besides the emphasis on the organisational 
boundaries, the RD approach goes beyond the SC 
"best-fit" principle by admitting that, under conditions 
of relatively abundant resources, the burden on the 
organisation becomes weaker and the environmental 
pressures can be met with more than one efficient 
boundary-spanning solution.  
As with the SC approach, all the above theories 
provide a number of tools and principles that, once 
adopted to theorise about and manage MASs, can help 
take some steps towards a science of MASs that is 
theoretically more comprehensive and empirically 
more satisfactory. The first lesson that we learn is that, 
when the conditions for rational planning are satisfied, 
the issue of how to best structure a MAS may be ill-
founded. Besides the difficulties related to the problem 
of real-world agents' bounded rationality, there may be 
more than one efficient way to structure a MAS, and 
the relative desirability of these ways may depend on 
the interplay of the (conflicting) interests of the 
constituent agents. Furthermore, within the set of 
possible solutions, the MAS may also consider the 
modification of its boundaries, namely changing the 
number of its members and, more interestingly, 
establishing inter-systemic relations with other MASs. 
Finally, the notion of "slack" is new to MAS research, 
and as such it may help understand to what extent 
structural configurations that are prima facie inefficient 
from a cost/benefit viewpoint, can be regarded as the 
efficient solutions to the two-pronged problem of 
enabling the achievement of the system's objectives 
and meeting the members' needs to fulfil their own 
private interests.  
 
3.2.2.2 Adaptive Learning 
 
When the environment is too volatile to be predicted 
with sufficient accuracy, but at the same time is too 
stable for a mechanism of environmental selection to 
make the agents powerless in their cognitive and 
behavioural processes, variation in sociality cannot 
take place as a result of a rational calculation of the 
appropriate means with respect to some ends. In these 
situations, agents and MASs need to resort to processes 
of trial and error that, while still built on cognition, 
nonetheless emphasise a form of intelligence that is 
premised more on experiential learning than on a 
forward-looking rational calculation of expectations.  12
We can imagine a MAS as learning from its 
experience, modifying its behaviour incrementally on 
the basis of feedback from the environment. Solutions 
are tried, their outcomes experienced, and subsequent 
revisions may occur. Besides the environmental 
conditions of volatility and ambiguity specified above, 
there are four main conditions under which a 
mechanism of learning via trial and error can be more 
effective than, and sometime the only feasible 
alternative to, rational planning.  
First, agents and MASs may be partially 
unaware of their goals, intentions and preferences. The 
ambiguity of mental attitudes is a fundamental factor 
that, together with environmental volatility, can affect 
how sociality is organised. Agents and MASs can learn 
what to expect, what to aim for, how to form their 
goals, how to commit themselves to them, and how to 
structure their preferences. Attitudes can be seen as 
changing over time in response to experience. Second, 
agents and MASs may be unaware of their abilities; 
also, they can learn and improve abilities through 
experience. Learning abilities leads them to be more 
competent in the activities they have undertaken, and 
relatively less competent in the activities they have not 
undertaken. Third, agents' cognition may be only 
loosely linked to their behaviour. The situation is one 
that reflects some important inertial dynamics of 
MASs and their ability to inhibit the modification of 
individual behaviour on the basis of individual 
cognition. Fourth, the individual agents may be only 
partially capable of affecting the system of which they 
are members, because the mechanisms through which 
cognition and behaviour at the individual level are 
related to cognition and behaviour at the collective one 
may unknown or ambiguous. When these assumptions 
are satisfied, the degree of ambiguity and opaqueness 
is further increased, and the most effective sociality-
variation mechanism is to adaptively learn how to 
change sociality by trying solutions before thinking 
what solutions to try. 
Within organisational research, the most 
influential background to the development of adaptive 
experiential learning models can be identified in 
Simon's work on bounded rationality [40]. Not only are 
individuals computationally and informationally 
limited in generating and using cognitive 
representations of reality, but they are also biased by 
the tendency to keep such representations also when 
confronted with empirical evidence that conspires 
against their accuracy [44]. Similar problems have 
been addressed with respect to the organisation by 
scholars with a more cognitively psychological 
background. Besides the role of time and attention as 
scarce resources and the role of relatively stable 
organisational routines [29], one of the most dominant 
speculations was that the environment is not an 
objective independent variable, but is what is perceived 
by the organisation. Should the organisation decide to 
adapt itself to the environment, this adaptation is 
intimately biased by the organisation's "choice" of 
what the environment is, and what are the relevant 
problems to which attention should be devoted. Along 
these lines, Weick's notion of "enacted environment" 
[48] emphasises the fact that the organisation 
unintentionally brings about changes in its perceived 
environment, while trying to adapt itself to 
environmental modifications that have been caused by 
its own attempts of adaptation.  
Two major models of organisation find their 
roots within the above conceptual framework of 
environmental ambiguity, cognitive indeterminism and 
behavioural adaptation. The first is the Garbage Can 
Model of Organisational Choice proposed by Cohen, 
March, and Olsen [10]. Here the organisation is 
viewed as an "organised anarchy" characterised by "a 
collection of choices looking for problems, issues and 
feelings looking for decision situations in which they 
might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which 
they might be the answer, and decision-makers looking 
for work" [10]. In this view, problematic preferences, 
unclear technology, and fluid participation make the 
organisation's typical choice opportunity appear like "a 
garbage can into which various kinds of problems and 
solutions are dumped by participants as they are 
generated" [10]. The second model to be mentioned 
here is the "Behavioral Theory of the Firm" proposed 
by Cyert and March [13]. Here, the organisation is 
modelled as an adaptively rational institution, 
"constrained by the uncertainty of its environment, the 
problems of maintaining a viable coalition, and the 
limitations on its capacity as a system for assembling, 
storing, and utilizing information" ([13] p. 117). 
Building on the ideas of bounded rationality, imperfect 
environmental matching, and unresolved conflict, the 
authors attempt to formalise a theory of organisational 
goals, expectations and choice. In doing so, four major 
relational concepts are introduced as fundamental to an 
understanding of the decision-making undertaken in a 
modern, large-scale business organisation. These 
concepts are: quasi resolution of conflict (i.e., conflict 
among members' goals is resolved by using local 
rationality, acceptable-level decision rules, and 
sequential attention to goals); uncertainty avoidance 
(i.e., organisations avoid uncertainty by using 
feedback-react decision procedures and by arranging a 
negotiated environment); problemistic search (i.e., 
search is stimulated by a problem and is directed 
towards finding a solution to that problem); and 
organisational learning (i.e., organisations exhibit 
adaptive behaviour over time). 
Linking this conceptual framework to MAS 
research is quite straightforward if we think that many 
of the implications of both behavioural models 
discussed above heavily rely upon computer 
simulations. However, besides this methodological 
aspect, the research thread here discussed seems to 
have the potential to affect one of the core conceptual 
tools adopted in MAS theory and practice, namely the 
Belief-Desire-Intention logic and agent architecture 
[52]. If mental attitudes may be ambiguously defined, 
if agents may not be aware of their intentions and 
goals, then behaviour cannot always be seen as 
triggered by the agents' mental states. Behaviour may 
also come before cognition, and therefore action  13
specifications should be allowed to be instantiated 
before and independently of the instantiation of the 
mental attitudes. These, in turn, become a function of 
the agent's actions. In this view, actions are not rational 
because they are planned on the basis of mental 
attitudes that are rational a priori; rather, mental 
attitudes are rational because they are adaptively 
adjusted to actions that are rational a posteriori. 
Another interesting implication of the adaptive 
learning framework has to do with the role of 
randomness in MASs. Not only under the conditions of 
unclear technology and agents' ambiguous preferences, 
but also when the number and identity of the agents is 
problematic and mutable, MASs may look more like 
"organised anarchies" than structured systems, and 
their behaviour more like a "garbage can" than an 
organised process. These conditions, for example, are 
satisfied by today's internet-based communities where 
members randomly enter and exit without knowing 
each other, thus making the communities' size and 
boundaries extremely uncertain. In such situations, the 
nature of the MAS's behaviour, the time it takes to be 
performed, and the problem it solves may depend on a 
relatively complicated intermeshing of elements, 
ranging from the mix of choice opportunities available 
at any one time, the mix of problems that have access 
to the MAS, and the mix of solutions looking for 
problems. To some extent, extending the concept of 
MAS so as to cover not only the traditional notion of 
integrated system with coordinated tasks, but also the 
idea of "loosely coupled" systems in which everybody 
can do everything and where behaviour is loosely 
coupled to intentions, may have a paradoxical 
consequence. In fact, loosely coupling phenomena 
ensure that some degree of foolishness will occur 
within MASs, no matter how useful for rational 
coordination and control it may be. Following March's 
argument [30], it might then be speculated that a deep 
understanding of the actual behaviour of computational 
MASs should rest not only on a good technology of 
distributed intelligence but also on a good technology 
of "distributed foolishness". 
 
3.2.2.3 Rational Proactiveness 
 
When tension on resources is low enough to enable the 
agents to control their own dependencies, but at the 
same time high enough to ensure a differentiation in 
the agents' control over resources, and furthermore 
when environmental volatility is too low for natural 
unplanned selection to take place, but at the same time 
high enough to ensure a reasonable amount of 
differentiation in the agents' abilities to cope with 
uncertainty, then sociality may be generated through 
mechanisms that heavily rely upon agents' 
proactiveness. The issue of proactiveness is a delicate 
one as it rests on a radical reconsideration of the 
boundaries between MAS and environment. With 
emergence, the environment is seen as an independent 
variable that can deterministically affect sociality by 
making agents' cognition relatively powerless. With 
rational planning and adaptive learning, the 
environment is still regarded as an independent 
variable that, by providing a set of constraints to 
agents' cognition, impacts on sociality with varying 
degrees of intensity. When rationally selected, sociality 
is therefore the outcome of decisions under 
environmental constraints. Conversely, proactiveness 
draws on the idea that the environment is relatively 
impotent in its effect on sociality. Not only can 
sociality be rationally selected (either by calculation or 
by learning), but also this selection is unconstrained: 
whether and how sociality is generated and changes 
over time ultimately depends on the agents' and MASs' 
decisions. To some extent, this line of argument may 
lead to a re-assessment of the old sociological 
speculation about the micro-macro link. In fact, being 
proactive for a MAS means not only deciding and 
acting under no environmental constraints, but also 
transforming its own deciding and acting into 
constraints for others' deciding and acting. Therefore, 
there is no environment as such for the proactive MAS; 
rather, the MAS is the environment for other MASs.  
Within organisational research, the notion that 
organisational structure and behaviour are imbued with 
logic, cognition and rationality has historically led to 
emphasise the role of strategic choice in the exercise of 
power by the organisation over its internal structure 
and its relations with the environment. In section 
3.2.2.1, we have already mentioned the contribution of 
Child as to the explanation of decision-making in 
terms of strategic events built on the "value positions" 
and preferences of those who hold power [9]. In turn, 
these studies were prompted by Chandler's idea of the 
managers' "visible hand" in shaping the structural 
forms of American industrial enterprises [8]. Here, 
managers are viewed as acting in a proactive role, and 
their behaviour is described as intendedly purposeful, 
hedonistic, and rational. Phenomenologists have 
provided additional impetus for this view. They 
suggested that organisations are largely the product of 
choice and the way individuals construct their social 
realities [3]. Finally, recent advances in cybernetics 
and autopoietic systems theory suggest the idea of the 
organisation as a cognitive self-referential and self-
organising system where coordination among its 
components is designed and implemented from within 
[32]. In this view, the organisation is autonomously 
self-referential, in that it subordinates its behaviour to 
maintaining itself and its internal structure; also, it is 
autonomously pro-active, in that its boundaries and the 
type of environment in which it acts entirely depend on 
how its auto-creation is undertaken. 
Within the MAS literature the concept of self-
organising MASs has been partially considered by 
researchers interested in designing the best match 
among task, environment, structure and performance 
[42]. However, these studies still conceive the 
environment in the usual structural-contingent way of a 
set of constraints to which the MAS needs to adapt. 
Along these lines, the concept of proactiveness in 
MAS research is meant to convey the idea of an agent's 
being able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour [52]. 
However, this behaviour is still seen as performed by  14
agents who are constrained by and embodied in some a 
priori environment. Conversely, the studies we 
discussed in this section suggest the idea that proactive 
agents may not only exploit, but also create serendipity 
[52]. Further, for proactive agents, there may be not an 
a priori environment in which they can be modelled as 
embedded. At most, in such cases, if we still are to 
maintain a notion of environment, this should be 
defined only a posteriori, after and as a result of the 
agents' actions, as the set of constraints that these 
agents, by acting, impose on others' behaviour.  
 
4. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
We started this paper by proposing that there is a need 
for a new science of MASs. This idea was rooted in the 
observation that many forms of sociality (e.g. large-
scale loosely coupled knowledge communities; virtual 
organisations; large business corporations) cannot be 
adequately understood if we limit our analytical tools to 
those offered by mainstream MAS research. 
Confronted with this downside, we advocated the 
possibility of looking for the contributions given by 
some of the leading scholars in organisation theory, in 
an attempt to define a new, richer and more complex 
notion of sociality. Our case for the advantages of this 
new integrated approach was presented throughout the 
paper in a number of steps. First, a new conception of 
MAS has been introduced, distinct from and broader 
than the definitions traditionally offered by MAS 
theory. Second, a model centred around this notion of 
MAS has been developed. Third, the main sociality-
variation mechanisms underpinning this model have 
been discussed in the light of a new integrated 
perspective that brought together a number of divergent 
contributions within organisational thought, all 
prevalently centred around the relation between 
organisation and environment.  
A science is fundamentally an articulated 
combination of problems,  theories to examine and 
explain these problems, and methodologies to 
empirically evaluate these theories. A new science of 
MASs needs to be built upon all these components. In 
this paper, an attempt has been made to suggest some 
of the problems that, in our view, should confront the 
MAS community. Further, some steps towards a new 
theory of MASs for addressing (some of) these 
problems have been taken. This theory has been 
articulated into a model of MAS and a number of 
implications about what structure and behaviour a 
MAS is expected to exhibit under different conditions. 
As such, the theory appeals to a notion of MAS that is 
consistent with a dual-faceted perspective. First, MAS 
as an analytical tool for representing and reasoning 
about sociality. Second, MAS as a set of high-level 
organisational principles that can be used by agents for 
organising a wide range of interrelationships and 
interactions among them. In this respect, the theory can 
be used not only for enhancing our understanding of 
how sociality and its organisation may vary over time, 
but also as a tool for improving practitioners' ability to 
design and manage efficient architectures for 
computational MASs. Even so, however, the theory, as 
such, is incomplete. In fact, it is incumbent upon any 
theoretical attempt at describing, explaining, or 
predicting new facts, to also provide a set of 
propositions that can be empirically controlled and 
tested [25]. This methodological imperative, in turn, 
calls for the operationalisation of the variables through 
which the propositions of the theory are expressed. 
These considerations, therefore, suggest the avenues 
along which our future work will progress.  
Finally, on a more epistemological level, the 
results of our efforts can also be evaluated in terms of 
what has been done and what is to be done next, 
towards meeting our initial challenge of a new science 
of MASs. First, a science needs to be appraised from a 
theoretical perspective, namely in terms of what type of 
theories are used to address what problems. This is 
precisely the arena in which this paper can be placed. 
Obviously, what is required next is the development of 
other different (maybe conflicting) theories, that appeal 
to different scholarly fields in order to provide an 
increasingly richer and more articulate notion of 
sociality. Second, a science finds its specificity in the 
type of methodologies and methods it resorts to. The 
hallmark of current MAS practice is the use of the 
computer to engineer systems that can autonomously 
make good decisions about what to do [52]. If this is 
the case, a new science of MASs should then be 
expected to be centred around the use of software 
engineering for designing and building computational 
MASs. Besides the benefits they can provide in terms 
of real-world applications (e.g. in electronic 
commerce), these systems can also be used as 
computational models that, once validated, can enhance 
our understanding of the "real" systems of which they 
are the analog. 
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Figure 1. A Unified Framework for Representing and Reasoning about Multi-Agent Systems. 
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